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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I

STATE OF UT AH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
IVOR D. JONES and RUA C. JONES, CASE No. 11801
his wife, and STATE BANK OF
(
SOUTHERN UTAH,
'
Defendants and Respondents.'

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The nature of this case is a review of a jury trial
in the District Court of Iron County, Utah, pertaining to
a condemnation of several small pieces of land in Iron
County, State of Utah, for purposes of Interstate Highway 15. This particular land is located approximately
five miles North and slightly East of Cedar City in Iron
County, State of Utah, and is on a large gentle curve
where the road turns from Northeast of North to Northeast toward Summit, Utah, as one proceeds northerly on
said Interstate 15. Condemnation was allowed by the
District Court of Iron County, Utah, and the matter was
tried before an Iron County jury commencing 25 June,
1969, and terminating on 26 June, 1969. This particular
case was unique from one standpoint: The jury consisted of eight women.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
As stated above, this was a jury trial by eight women, commencing 25 .June, 1969, and terminating 26
June, 1969: The matter was finally submitted to the jury,
and they were sent out of the courtroom at 4:24 p. m. on
26 June, 1969, and came in with a verdict at 6:42 the
same evening. The verdict was as follows'
1

Market value of the property taken by the
State (includes property taken in fee as
well as for easements) _______________________________ _
Damages, if any, by reason of severance ___ _
Total Judgment ----------------------------------------------

$3,121.30
l0,801.00
13,921.30
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment
n.o.v. by and for the reason that it was quite apparent
the damages awarded by the jury were the result or
misunderstanding of the Court's instructions, and by
and for the further reason that all evidence offered bv
the defendants was based upon a sale of lots out of
subdivision and the entire case of the defendants was
improper; that for this reason the judgment should be
reduced to the sum of $2400.00 which was the only quaJ.
ified testimony given pertaining to damages.

Plaintiff also filed an alternate motion for remittiture asking for the remitting of all severance damages
awarded by the jury in the above entitled matter, by
and for the reason that it was most apparent that the
jury did not understand the court's instructions and
misapplied same, and that the severance damages as
awarded by the jury were excessive, and that there was
no acceptable evidence offered by the defendants for
severance damages.
Plaintiff also made an alternate motion for a new
trial for the same reasons.
These motions were argued to the Court by respective counsel for the parties in a law and motion day on
10 July 1969, same having been reset by court order
from a later law and motion day originally scheduled
for 17 July 1969.
The Honorable C. Nelson Day issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order on Motion for Judgment N.0.V. or
for New Trial after having taken the matter under advisement on the 24th day of July, 1969, which was duly
filed thereafter by the Clerk of the District Court of Iron
County, Utah. There are some very interesting findings
in this memorandum decision which has been included
in Designation of Record on Appeal of the Appellant as
Item 16. These findings that are of special interest are
as follows:
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"4. The landowner, Ivor D. Jones, testified he valued
all of his land on the southeast side of U. s. 91 at
$1,500.00 per acre, including the 35.95 acres taken and
' at
the severance
to the 37.45 acres remaining
an average of $1.115.70 per acre or just over 74 per cent
of his $1,500 00 per acre valuation.
"5. The defendants' expert witness, Mr. Marcellus Palmer valued all of defendants' land on the southeast
side of U. S. 91 at $1,490.00 per acre, including that
taken by the State, and the severance damages to the
acres remaining at an average of $1,104.58 per
acre, also just over 74 per cent of his $1,490.00 per
acre valuation.
"6. The only other witness as to valuation was the
State's expert, Mr. Ken Esplin, who valued the defendants' land southeast of U. S. 91 at $55.00 per acre
for that portion broken up and $28.00 per acre for
the native brush land. He placed his severance damages at $27.50 and $14.00 per acre respectively or exactly 50 per cent on the remainder land.
"7. The jury, which consisted of eight women, returned a verdict of $3,121.30 for the property taken and
$10,800 for severance damages. This was computed at
$86.80 per acre for the 35.96 acres of property taken
and $288.38 per acre as severance damages to the 37.45
acres of property remaining. The $288.38 per acre severance damages to the property is 332 plus per cent of
the $86.80 per acre valuation of the property actually
taken.

"11. The Court is of the opinion that the jury verdict
\Vas not based properly on the evidence of the case,
and that the jury's award of severance damages in the
amount they did, was grossly excessive.

''12. The plaintiff State of Utah is entitled (1) To an
order of this Court reducing the total judgment herein
to the sum of $8,000.00, or (2) in the event the defendants filP objections thereto within 15 days of the date
hereof a nev.: trial. If no objections by defendants. are
filed
15 days from date hereof, the clerk· is
directed to enter the judgment for defendants on such
3

reduced. amount .. If
are filed within such 15day per10d, the Jury verdict 1s to be set aside and thr
case set for retrial."
The defendants failed to file any objections unde
the situations set fourth, in Paragraph 12 of said
orandum decision, and plaintiff elected to appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court
find that the defendants offered no acceptable evidence
of value, and to render a judgment against the plaintiff
pursuant to the testimony of Mr. Esplin the amount of
$2400.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant's Exhibit 1 which was not includ.
ed in the designation of record on appear, due to size and
inconvenience of transportation, was a large photographic map which included the entire project of the State
Road Commission from North Cedar City to Summit in
Iron County, Utah. Counsel now attempts to replace the
photo map by a word picture. The defendant, Mr. Jones,
had acquired approximately 1,000 acres of land, more or
less, approximately six miles North Northeast of Cedar
City, Utah, in Iron County, somewhat to the East of what
is locally known as Webster's Hill where U. S. 91 turns
and runs generalJy northeasterly toward Summit, Utah
This property had been acquired approximately fifteen
or twenty years, or more, before condemnation, and the
property was already bisected by U. S. Highway 91 on
the southern extremity thereof, and by a dirt road which
left U. S. 91 at approximately the middle of the area
where the Jones property went across 91; then due West
through the Jones property to Enoch, Utah. Of the Jones
land, 160 acres was South of this road and the remainder
was North of this road. The property that is spoken of
and described in the exhibits as being subdivided, is the
area between the Enoch road and Highway 91. The large
portion of the property is on the North of the Enoch
road. In Mr. Jones' property acquirements in this particular area, corners of three pieces extended Southeast of
91. There was approximately one-fourth mile between
4

these pieces. The corn;tl"uclion of Interstate 15 was on the
Southeast of 91, with '.H being used for a frontage road
on the nort!Hvest side. Interstate 15 also coming North
from Cedar City made the curve to the right and headed
for Summit in more or less a northeasterly direction,
and took a portion of each of the three parcels that were
on the southeast side of 91 before the Interstate was
planned. The property was ci.11 zoned A-1, or Agricultural,
under the County zoning area. The taking in the three
parcels consisted of 34.35 acres actually taken, and easements of 1.61 acres. The date of taking was 18 October,
1%7. On Parcel 9, the taking was 2.01 acres. However,
approximately 8 acres were left between Interstate 15
and Highway 91 on the north side of Interstate 15, On
Parcel 10, the taking, including the easements, was almost 1J acres, with a small parcel left South of Interstate 15 and another parcel left North of Interstate 15,
and between it and Highway 91. The parcel between Interstate 15 and Highway 91 was narrower than on Parcel 9. Again, on Parcel 11, the actual taking was something over 20 acres, with in excess of 28 acres left South
of Interstate 15, and nine and a fraction left between Interstate 15 and High\\ ay 91 on the North of Interstate 15,
again longer and narrower than the previous parcels. All
parties testified that the land of Mr. Jones Northwest of
Highway 91 was not affected by the construction of the
Interstate. All lands South of Highway 91 and affected
by the Interstate were zoned A-1, or Agricultural. A
portion of the land North of Highway 91 and South of
the Enoch road, consisting of approximately 100 acres
being severed from the rest of the Jones land on the
:\orth by the Enoch rnad, had been subdivided and sales
\'.ere taking place in that area. The area South of Highway 91, which included Parcel 11, had been planted into wheatgrass pactures. Those areas South of the Highway 91 \Vhich included Parcels 9 and 10, were in native
brush, rocks and trees. Parcels 10 and 11 had been fenced. Parcel 9 had not been fenced. On the South of tnese
parcels was public domain. An earthen tank had been
made on the area including Parcel 11 to hold rain wa'ter
for stockwatering which was generally not available
otherwise unless stockwatering was accomplished by
hauling \Yater whi::n these areas were pastured. The areas
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from which Parcels 9, 10 and 11 were taken did not touch
each other, and were severed from other property of the
defendants by Highway 91. Prior to the construction, the
defendants owned three distinct parcels of land South
of Highway 91, each of which was affected by the construction of Interstate 15.

ARGUMENT
Point I
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE OF VALUE ON THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The trial court erred in allowing the defendants' testimony to be presented on a subdivision basis. The testimony of all defendants was quite clear that the property South of Highway 91 had not been subdivided at the
time of the taking, and had been left out intentionally
of any plans of subdivision that the defendants had initiated, and was left out at the election of the defendants.
This may be found in the testimony of Ivor D. Jones,
property owner, commencing in the transcript on Page
21, line 25, through Page 22, line 8. Plaintiff's objections
to going forward on this basis were overruled, which may
be found on Page 22, line 17, to Page 23, line 5, and again
on Page 24, line 4, through page 27, line J 9. All this was
testified to by the property owner on Page 24 in the transcript from line 1 through line 12, and these were identical figures with those later used by Mr. Palmer and
tied to the Village Green subdivision.
It became quite clear that the defendants were re-

lying entirely on sales of lots out of subdivisions in a
Voir Dire Examination commencing on Page 53, brought
on by questions asked on Page 53, line 1, said item running to Page 63, line 14. On Page 61, at line 17, of the
transcript, a motion for mistrial was made by counsel
for plaintiff, which was overruled. On Page 62 at line 20,
motion to strike all testimony relating to subdivision
purchases was made, and along with overruling this motion, on Page 62, line 26, the Court acknowledged that
the objections went to Mr. Palmer's entire line of testi·
mony, and both the objections, the motion to strike and
the mis-trial were overruled and denied, ending on Page
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63 at line 6. Again on Page 63 at line 9, as a matter of
record, a continuing objection to any testimony cone:erning these subdivisions was allowed so that it was not necessary to make an objection to each question. On line
13, the Court allowecl the objection to become a matter
of record. The acknowledgment of the Court and the understanding that the objecfrms were to run to the entire line of testimony were reiterated, on Page 71, line
24, to Page 71, line 26 of the transcript.
A complete examination of the transcript of the
defendants' entire testimony fails to reveal any other information upon which to base an opinion of the value of
the property, than the sales out of the subdivision acros
Highway 91 to the North. Under these conditions, Mr.
Palmrr came up with an opinion of value of $1,500.00 per
acre which was identical with the opinion of value of
Mr. Ivor D. Jones, and both admitted that this was $25.00
and $50.00 land for grazing land, and that there had been
no attempt to put a subdivision on the South side of 91.
There is a whole line of cases that hold that even
in city areas with subdivisions going up all around, unless the property has actually been subdividied, the measure of damages is to be based upon what the evidence
shows was the value at the date of service of summons,
and that a situation where value is placed on small parcels, not in the size of the actual parcel, is improper. In
Redwood City Elemenatry School District vs McGregor,
276 P2d 78. a California case decided in 1954, it was held
that a J
acre parcel of improved land used for commercial production of flowers and various item in connection therewith, the jury was required to determine
the value ot the parcel not as if it had been divided into
small parcels, but as it was used as a whole on the date
of the taking, and any evidence as to what the owner
might plan to do with the land could not be considered
as enhancing its market value. This has been endorsed
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State of Utah
vs Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 291 P2d 1028. In this case, d,efendants testified as to value based upon the price. at
which it could be sold in small pieces if buyers -could be
found. and failure to grant plaintiff's motion to strjke
''
7

defendants' expert testimony as to values was under th
cirsumstance prejudicial, which prejudice was not overe
come by the instructions given. This case holds that
condemnee is not entitled to realize a profit on his
perty and that it must go to the condemnor for its faii
market value, as is, irrespective of any claimed value.
based on an aggregate of values of individual lots in a
subdivision which one hopes to sell at a future time to
individuals rather than to an individual. This rule ap.
plies, whether the property is platted or not. The sale
should be the sale as a single unit, regardless of whatever
the state of completion of the subdivision may be, and a
fair market value is the price that same will bring from
a willing buyer buying the whole tract. The Utah State
Supreme Court has long held that any anticipated profits which were contractial are therefore not recoverable
and should not be allowed. In addition to the Tedesco
case, this was held in State Road Commission vs Noble.
6 Utah 2d, 42, 305 P2d 495; Weber Basin vs Braeg·
ger, 8 Utah 2d 346, 334, P2d 758, and many others. Yet,
although cases are legion that hold that the condemnee
is not entitled to a profit and irrspective of any claimed
value based on an aggregate of values of individual lots
in a subdivision which one hopes to sell at a future time
to many individuals rather than to one individual, at the
same time over continuing objection, and motion for
mis-trial, this was allowed in the case now being appealed, and no other evidence was offered whatsoever.
Under these conditions, there is only one acceptable
bit of evidence as to the value in the entire case, and
that is the testimony of Mr. Esplin, commencing at Page
144, line 12, to Page 147. line 29, where he gave his valuations, where he got them, and came up with an opinion
as to the fair market value of the damage done to the
landowner of $2400. Under these conditions, there can
be no question but that the trial court again erred on
its failure to grant the motion of the plaintiff for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of $2400.
Pont II

THE JURY WAS ENTIRELY CONFUSED.
There is no question that the ladies of the jury were
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confused. In all probability the undersigned was a party
to the confusion. In Judge Day's Memorandum Decision
and Order on Motion for Juctgment N.O.V. or For New
Trial, he makes a finding to this effect. This is finding
7. Regardless of how one approaches this problem,
either from the standpoint of subdivision lots, grazing
ground, or any other way to approach values on these
properties, certainly on that portion of the land that was
.Southeast of Highway 91, through which the freeway
\,·cnt. regardless of \vhat value we put on it, the man is
llarmed a greater amount per acre by entirely depriving
him of his land than he is by leaving it in odd shapes
and limiting the use. Yet, in Finding No. 7 of the trial
Judge, on the motion for judgment n.o.v. there is a
tl'l€ motion fop judgment n.o.v-.
find/«-}n which these items have been figured out.
Three Thousand One Hundred and Twenty-one Dollars and Thirty Cents was the finding for the property
taken. Ten Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars was the finddamages. Yet, the odd thing is that the
ing for
two acreages were almost irl.entical in the totals. The
35.96 acres of propetry taken, including the easements,
divided into $3,121.30 is $86.90 per acre. Yet, for approxi:nately an acre and a half more land, of which the defendant still has lhe use, he was given damages of $10,800.00 which computes out to $288.39 per acre. Regardless of how we aµproach this problem, severance should
not be a greater amount per acre than the land actually
taken. The action of the trial judge in reducing the judgment to S8,000.00 is based entirely upon a finding of confusion. The failure of the defendant to file an objection,
as set forth in Finding No. 12, is an admission of the confusion. Certainly, if the defendants had been of the opinion that this testimony was correct and the jury was not
confused, they would not consent to an almost $6,000.00
reduction in a jury verdict under these circumstances.
The action of the trial court reduced the verdict from
$13,921.30 to $8,000. Why should the defendants acquiese?
This acquiescPnce alone is <m acknowledgment of the
confusion of the jury.
CONCLUSION

Under the circumstances of this matter, we can only
9

conclude that confusion prevailed; The jury speculate(
and came up with an unreasonable and wholly improper
verdict, and that inasmuch as the only proper opinion
of value was that of Mr. Esplin in the sum of $2400.00,
the entire matter should be remanded to the trial court
with orders to enter a judgment in favor of the defend.
ants for $2400.00 and interest on the portions not paid
at the time of obtaining the order of occupation in accordance with the statutory provisions applicable there.
to.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General of Utah
PATRICK H. FENTON
Special Assistant Attorney General
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